Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created Danger Theory by Kernodle, Jeremy D.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - January 2001 Article 4 
1-2001 
Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government 
Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created Danger 
Theory 
Jeremy D. Kernodle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeremy D. Kernodle, Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government Liable Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created Danger Theory, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 165 (2001) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol54/iss1/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Policing the Police: Clarifying the
Test for Holding the Government
Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
State-Created Danger Theory
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 166
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE-CREATED DANGER
THEORY ............................................................................. 170
A. The History Of Government Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 .......................................................... 170
B. The Definition of 'Deprivation" Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 ..................................................................... 171
C. Lower Courts'Development of the State-Created
Danger Theory ........................................................ 174
1. The Theory Recognized ................................ 174
2. Lower Courts' Tests in Applying the State-
Created Danger Theory ............................... 177
a. Specific Plaintiff or Public at
Large ................................................. 178
b. Affirmative Act .................................. 180
c. Causation .......................................... 182
d. Removing All Protection .................... 184
e. Culpability ........................................ 185
III. A SINGLE RESTRICTIVE TEST TO CONFINE THE STATE
CREATED DANGER THEORY TO APPROPRIATE CASES ........... 187
A. The Recommended Test .......................................... 187
1. Affirmative Act ............................................ 187
2. Specific Plaintiff or Specific Group of
Plaintiffs ...................................................... 189
3. Culpability ................................................... 190
4. Causation .................................................... 191
165
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a. Government's Act Did Not Return
Plaintiff to Already-Existing
D anger .............................................. 191
b. Government's Act Was Not "Too
R em ote" ............................................. 192
c. Government's Act Removed All Avenues
of Protection ...................................... 193
5. The Overall Situation Shocks the Conscience
of the Court .................................................. 194
B. Application of the Recommended Test to Facts of
Piotrowski v. City of Houston ................................. 195
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND GOVERNMENT FREEDOM
SUPPORT OF THE UNIFIED, NARROW APPROACH OF THE
RECOMMENDED TEST ......................................................... 197
A . N eed for Unity ........................................................ 197
B. Need for Confinement ............................................. 198
1. Supreme Court Precedent Supports a Narrow
Application of the State-Created Danger
Theory ......................................................... 199
2. Government Freedom to Make Choices
Requires Confining the State-Created Danger
Theory ......................................................... 200
V . CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 203
I. INTRODUCTION
"The king can do no wrong."-William Blackstonel
"It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself in fa-
vor of its citizens as it is to administer the same between private individuals."
-Abraham Lincoln
2
On October 20, 1980, as Barbara Piotrowski left a donut
shop, a man hired by her ex-boyfriend to kill her shot her four times
in the chest.8 Within twenty-four hours, the Houston Police De-
partment ("HPD") arrested the gunman and his driver and obtained
1. 1 WILLIAM BLAcESTONE, COMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 238 (1765).
2. Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL. REV. 149, 149 (1998).
3. Brief for Appellant at 6.7, Piotrowski v. City of Houston (1999). Piotrowski survived tho
attack and, though now partially paralyzed, was able to file a lawsuit.
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their confessions. 4 Piotrowski's millionaire ex-boyfriend moved to
England and was never arrested nor brought to trial.
Fifteen years later, Piotrowski sued the City of Houston un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving her of her constitutional right to
life and liberty and equal protection.6 She based her lawsuit pri-
marily on information that a month before the shooting, an HPD
officer received a tip from a man who claimed he was offered money
to kill Piotrowski, chop up her body, and dump it in the Gulf of
Mexico.7 Exactly what HPD did with the tip is unclear.8 What they
did not do was explicitly warn Piotrowski 9 or furnish her with police
protection.' 0 Piotrowski further claimed that HPD colluded with her
ex-boyfriend both before and after the shooting by harassing her
and protecting him." Specifically, she alleged that two or three
HPD officers worked for her ex-boyfriend on their off-duty hours,
helping him remove from her apartment all its contents, ransacking
her house on another occasion, and possibly providing the gunman
with a copy of her mug shot.' HPD pointed out that Piotrowski's
allegations relied solely upon the conduct of a few isolated officers
who moonlighted as security guards for her ex-boyfriend's friend.
13
4. Id. at 7.
5. Brief for Appellee at 15.
6. Brief for Appellant at 6. Piotrowski explained that she waited so long to file her lawsuit
because the HPD "code of silence" concealed police involvement in the shooting, thus delaying
her awareness of the involvement. Brief for Appellee at 2. The City of Houston points out that
Piotrowski knew the information earlier and even included it in her book, Sleeping with the
Devil, published in 1991. Brief for Appellant at 11.
7. See DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 11, 1998, at 12A. The tip came from Rick Waring,
who told HPD officer John Liles that he had been solicited to kill Piotrowski for $10,000. Brief
for Appellant at 8.
8. Officer Liles claims he took the tip seriously, reported it to his supervisor, and filed a
report with the homicide division. The report has never been found. The officer in charge of the
Piotrowski shooting investigation did not become aware of the tip until the morning after the
shooting when Liles informed him. Id. at 8-9.
9. Brief for Appellee at 11-12. There is also evidence that Liles, the HPD officer, told
Waring not to warn Piotrowski because the matter "was in police hands now." Id. at 11. The
City countered that Piotrowski was well aware of the danger because she was familiar vith the
violence and anger directed toward her by her ex-boyfriend. Brief for Appellant at 30-31.
10. BriefforAppellee at 14.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 7, 8, 10. It is unclear whether the police actually gave Piotrowski'e photograph to
the gunman. Piotrowski argued that because her mugshot was found with the gunman, then the
photo "could only have come from the police." There were, however, no further facts to support
this claim. Id. at 10-12.
13. The BPD argued that the officers working for her ex-boyfriend's friend did so completely
on their own. The HPD admitted that this activity violated HPD policy because the officers
never obtained the requisite approval Brief for Appellant at 24-25. Moreover, HPD claimed it
followed protocol at all times and would have done "everything possible" to prevent Piotrovsis
harm had the tip not been misplaced prior to the shooting. See id. at 9-10.
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Nevertheless, after a jury verdict in Piotrowski's favor, a federal
judge ordered the City to pay her $18.1 million..
14
In one respect, the decision against the City of Houston
seems fair. If the police department affirmatively aided in the trag-
edy that befell Ms. Piotrowski, then it certainly violated 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which provides tort-like remedies for persons deprived of
their constitutional rights "under color of state law." 15 On the other
hand, if the police department was simply negligent because it
failed to follow the requisite procedures regarding the tip, then the
department is protected by sovereign immunity. 16 When stated this
way, distinguishing between the two possibilities may seem rather
easy. Nonetheless, the situation in Piotrowski illustrates a growing
trend in federal courts of finding state officials and municipalities 17
liable for violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a novel theory called
"state-created danger."
14. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, No. Civ.A. 95-4046, 1998 WL 268827, at *1 (S.D. Tox,
May 5, 1998). The judge reduced the award from over $21 million to $18 million because the
judge decided that the plaintiff had duplicated some of her claims. See DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
May 11, 1998, at 12A The City has appealed the decision; oral argument was held December 6,
1999, before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
15. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998); see also infra note 29 and
accompanying text.
16. If the police were only negligent, then Piotrowski cannot sue under § 1983 for a Duo
Process Clause violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (holding that the
Due Process Clause is not implicated by a state official's negligent act, which causes unintended
loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property). Instead, she would have to sue under a state tort
claim, but sovereign immunity prevents a plaintiff from suing the government in tort without the
government's consent. See infra note 27 (explaining that sovereign immunity is a judicial dec.
trine barring suits against the government for torts committed by its agents unless waived by
legislative enactment).
17. The proper defendant in a § 1983 case is a government employee or a municipality. See
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that a municipality is a "person"
for the purposes of § 1983 liability). To state a claim against a municipality, however, the plain.
tiff has the additional burden of showing that the government official acted pursuant to an offi-
cial "policy or custom." See id. (rejecting a respondeat superior theory as a basis for holding
cities liable); see also Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997) (noting that the "pol.
icy or custom" requirement ensures that municipal liability arises only for deprivations resulting
from decisions of duly authorized legislative bodies or other officials whose acts may be fairly
said to constitute those of the municipality). Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly
held that state agencies or counties are proper defendants, lower courts often treat these entities
as "municipalities." See, e.g., Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906-07 (3d Cir.
1997) (ignoring the question of proper defendant and addressing the liability of school district
under the state-created danger theory); Ross v. Lake County, 910 F.2d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1990)
(requiring plaintiff to show that a deputy was following a Lake County policy or custom). The
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may never sue the State itself. Will v. Michigan Dep't of
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989) (section 1983 construed to exclude actions against "States").
Thus, for the purposes of this Note, the defendant will be generically termed "government,"
which includes both government officials and municipalities but does not include the State.
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The state-created danger theory arises when a state actor
creates the dangerous circumstances that allow some private party
or other force to deprive a citizen of her constitutional rights.'5
Even though there is an intervening, non-governmental actor,
courts hold the government liable since it created the situation in
which the injury occurred. 19 Because the Supreme Court has never
explicitly or clearly addressed the theory,20 the federal circuits ap-
ply it unevenly and erratically.21 Some circuits have not recognized
the theory at all, 22 and others are requiring different levels of cul-
pability and action by the municipality or state actor with varying
requirements placed on the plaintiff.23
This Note argues for a unitary and restrictive standard with
which courts should judge these claims. A court today faces an in-
credible task of sorting among other circuits' tests and standards in
analyzing a state-created danger case. Moreover, because many
courts employ generous and unrestrained tests, a court is quite
likely to impose liability on the government, effectively replacing
state tort law with § 1983 and allowing the judiciary to second-
guess legislative decisions. Part II, after examining the historical
context in which the theory has arisen, will set out the circuits'
varying standards and illustrate their inconsistencies and prob-
lems. In Part III, this Note presents a more workable, narrow test
18. Reedy. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, even though a private actor
directly and affirmatively causes the injury to the citizen, the government may be held liable. Id.
at 1126-27; see also Christina M. Madden, Signs of Danger-The Third Circuit Emphasizes Fore-
seeability as the Crucial Element in the "State-Created Danger" Theory: Morse v. Lower Merion
School District, 43 VILL. L. REV. 947, 948-49 (1998) (recognizing that, pursuant to the "state-
created danger" theory, states can be held liable even if the State did not directly deprive the
person of his constitutional rights).
19. E.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) (flag-burners alleging
that the police created the danger by assuring "skinheads" they would not intervene if the "skin-
heads" wanted to attack the flagburners); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990)
(plaintiff alleging that a police chief created the danger because he prevented other police from
protecting her from her abusive husband); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348,
356 (1989) (finding that prison officials created the danger to a town clerk when they left her
alone with violent criminals working in city hall). For example, Piotrowski might allege that the
BPD created the situation in which the gunman shot her.
20. The Supreme Court mentioned the theory in dicta in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) ('Vhile the State may have been avare of the dan-
gers that Joshua faced... it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render
him more vulnerable to them.").
21. See discussion infra Part H.C.
22. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 n.* (4th Cir. 1995) '[Q]t is not strictly ac-
curate to suggest, as [the Plaintiff] does, that 'creation of risk' is a second exception to the rule of
DeShaney."). The First, Fifth, and the District of Columbia Circuits have not yet recognized the
theory. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
23. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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that all courts should adopt and apply. An illustration follows that
applies the test to the facts of Piotrowski v. City of Houston. Part IV
concludes that the proposed test is the best, most logical analysis of
these claims based on the historical context of § 1983, the Supreme
Court's reasons for mentioning the state-created danger theory in
dicta, and the need for freedom in government decision-making.
Specifically, Part IV asserts that a more restrictive test is impera-
tive because imposing liability may deter government officials from
taking risks and executing their functions for the public's greatest
benefit.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE-CREATED DANGER
THEORY
A. The History Of Government Liability Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State from depriving
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."24 This Due Process Clause was created as the analogue to the
Magna Carta and was "intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."25 Over time the
role of government increased and expanded, and with it the poten-
tial for abuse of power.26 Despite sovereign immunity granted to
governments in many common law tort actions,27 Congress, in reac-
tion to increasing abuses, created a constitutional tort remedy for
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment: the Civil Rights Act of
1871.28
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); see also Edwin Corwin, The Doctrine of
Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911).
26. See Harvard L. Rev. Ass'n, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2009
(1998).
27. See id. ('Sovereign immunity ... has been widely criticized, but is nevertheless firmly
rooted in American legal doctrine."). Sovereign immunity is the judicial doctrine that prevents
bringing suit against the State without its consent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed.
1998). The doctrine essentially bars suits against the government for the torts of its agents or
employees unless waived by legislative enactment. Id.
28. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Be-
comes A Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517, 517 (1987). Congress created Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to curb abuse by officials in southern states
who were colluding with the Ku Klux Klan against black citizens. See Patricia A. Burton &
Michael T. Burke, Defining the Contours of Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell
Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON. L. REV. 511, 513 (1989). The authors identify the
three main purposes of the legislation: First, to "override certain kinds of state laws"; second, to
provide redress where "state law was inadequate to provide such a remedy"; and third, to provide
[Vol. 54:1:165170
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Section I of the Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, holds
anyone liable who "under color of state law subjects... any citizen
. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution."29 In order to state a § 1983 claim, the
Supreme Court requires a plaintiff to show two essential elements:
(1) a person acting under color of state law committed the action
complained of; and (2) this action deprived a person of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.30 The Court has held that a person acts "under color
of' state law by using power obtained by virtue of the person s
authority under the law.3 1 The Court has defined "person" to in-
clude state employees as well as municipalities. 32 The Court, how-
ever, has struggled to define the term "deprivation;" that is, it is
uncertain how much a state actor or municipality must do in order
to "deprive" citizens of their rights and incur liability under § 1983.
B. The Definition of 'Deprivation" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The question of what constitutes "deprivation" is the focus of
any state-created danger case. Clearly, a government official incurs
§ 1983 liability when he acts directly and immediately on citizens to
deprive them of their constitutional rights.33 In a state-created dan-
ger case, however, the question is much more difficult: Has a state
a "federal remedy where state remedies, although adequate in theory, were not available in
practice." Id.; see also Mead, supra, at 518 n.6 (setting forth a letter written to Congress by
President Grant urging the adoption of the Civil Rights Act to combat the organized violence of
the Ku Klux Klan and local officials in the South).
29. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998). The statute provides:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the ju-
risdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
30. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
31. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); see also Caitlin E. Borgmann, Bat-
tered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280, 1284 (1990) (asserting that when a State acts, as when it issues a protec-
tive order, the State should be held to have assumed an affirmative duty that can give rise to
liability).
32. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978); see also supra note 17 (stat-
ing that the proper defendant in a § 1983 case is a state employee or a municipality and not the
State). Determining the proper defendant, however, is not the purpose of this Note; thus, any
reference to "government" includes both state officials and municipalities but not the State itselK
33. For example, when a prison official beats a prisoner, the official has directly caused the
harm to the prisoner and will be found liable under § 1983. See, e.g., Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d
914 (7th Cir. 1996).
2001]
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official "deprived" a citizen of any constitutional rights when the
official increases the danger to the citizen, but some other person or
force brings about the citizen's harm? For example, in Martinez v.
California, state officials unlawfully released a disturbed sex of-
fender who, five months later, murdered a fifteen-year-old girl.3 4
The Court held that although the officials wrongfully released the
killer, the act was not a deprivation of the victim's life "within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 5 In defining "depriva-
tion," the Court focused on causation and stated that the girl's
death was "too remote a consequence" of the State's action to hold
the officials liable under § 1983.36
Two years after Martinez, the Seventh Circuit wrestled with
the deprivation requirement and recognized a novel theory; when a
state actor puts a person in a position of danger from private actors
and then fails to protect the person, the government is "as much an
active tortfeasor as if it had thrown [the person] into a snake pit."8 7
The court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the government to protect its citizens or provide services;
thus, merely failing to protect a person in danger does not lead to §
1983 liability.38 Nonetheless, the court stated that if the govern-
ment first acts in a way that creates or increases the danger that
leads to a person's injury, and fails to protect the person, then the
government is liable under § 1983. 39
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted
this "snake pit" theory, it implicitly affirmed it seven years later in
dicta in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices.40 The Court in DeShaney first affirmed that a government is
not liable under § 1983 for simply failing to protect its citizens from
other private actors. 41 The Court made clear that nothing in the
Due Process Clause itself places an affirmative obligation on the
34. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1980). The release was unlawful because
the convicted offender had not been recommended for parole.
35. Id. at 284-85.
36. Id. at 285.
37. Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. Id.
39. Id. Judge Posner pointed out that "the line between action and inaction, between in-
flicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm" is tenuous. Id. Yet, when a court can discern
that the government acted in a way that eventually brought harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
should recover. Id.
40. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
41. Id. at 197 C'[A] State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.").
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government to ensure that its citizens enjoy their rights.42 Thus,
the Department of Social Services ("DSS") was not liable for failing
to protect Joshua DeShaney because it returned Joshua to the cus-
tody of his father, a known child abuser, who later beat him into
unconsciousness. 3 The Court concluded, however, that the govern-
ment could be liable under § 1983, even when there is an interven-
ing, third-party act, if the government takes a person into custody
and holds her there against her will.44 In this "special relationship"
situation, the government assumes a duty to provide the person
with safety and protection.45 Because Joshua was not in the gov-
ernment's custody, but in the custody of his father, the Court held
that the DSS was not liable under the "special relationship"
theory.4 Finally, in passing, the Court also noted that the DSS was
not liable because it "played no part in the creation" of Joshua's
danger, nor did it do anything to render Joshua any more vulner-
able to the danger. 47
After DeShaney, lower courts were left wondering whether a
§ 1983 action could be brought in cases in which some other actor
besides the government was the cause of the plaintiffs harm. Spe-
cifically, the question of whether the government sufficiently "de-
prived" a citizen of any rights when there was an intervening actor
remained unresolved. Courts soon inferred two separate theories
from DeShaney that could provide recovery to a plaintiff in such a
case. First, DeShaney made clear that one way a plaintiff may re-
cover is by showing that the government created a "special relation-
ship" with her in which the government so restrained her liberty
that she was unable to care for herself.48 Under this theory, the
government has a duty to protect the plaintiff against constitu-
tional interferences by private parties; the duty arises from the
government's affirmative act of incarceration that now limits the
42. Id. at 195.
43. Id. at 191-94. Joshua began his life in the custody of his father, was temporarily taken
into DSS custody after showing signs of abuse, but was returned to his father a short time later
by DSS when his father agreed to cooperate with caseworkers. Id.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 201.
47. Id. But see id. at 205, 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (focusing on the action the DSS took
with respect to Joshua-releasing him into his father's custody--and then arguing that the ma-
jority's opinion "construes the Due Process Clause to permit a State to displace private sources of
protection, and then... to turn away from the harm that it has promised to try to prevent").
48. Id. at 200.
2001]
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plaintiffs ability to protect herself.49 By narrowly defining the "spe-
cial relationship" theory, the Court in DeShaney effectively limited
a plaintiffs recovery under the theory to situations in which she is
confined against her will in a prison or mental hospital, and a pri-
vate actor injures her.50 The second method of finding the govern-
ment liable even when there is an intervening, private actor arises
from the Court's statement that the DSS was not liable because it
did not "create Joshua's danger."51 Courts soon called this second
method of recovery the "state-created danger" theory.
52
C. Lower Courts' Development of the State-Created Danger Theory
1. The Theory Recognized
The rather nebulous "creation of danger" dicta from De-
Shaney became the seed from which the lower courts have sown and
harvested the state-created danger theory. Specifically, courts soon
after DeShaney announced that if the government takes an affirma-
tive act, which increases the individual's risk of danger beyond
what it would have been absent state action, then the government
is liable. 53 Courts reached this conclusion by focusing on the dictum
in DeShaney, in which the majority stated that the DSS did not
create the danger to Joshua because it placed him "in no worse po-
sition than that in which he would have been had [the government]
not acted at all."5 4 Thus, immediately after DeShaney, most courts
never questioned the validity of the state-created danger theory and
instead assumed that it was the second well established method of
finding that the government has "deprived" a citizen of her rights
even though there was an intervening, private actor.55
49. See id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding that prison offi-
cial may be liable for "deliberate indifference" if he is subjectively aware of substantial risk of
harm to an inmate and fails to take reasonable measures to prevent the harm).
50. See Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort
DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 143 (1991).
51. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the "danger creation
theory" is the second exception to the DeShaney rule).
52. See infra notes 63-69 (listing cases in which various lower courts have adopted the
state-created danger theory).
53. E.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 355-56 (1lth
Cir. 1989).
54. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
55. E.g., L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the general rule of
DeShaney has two exceptions, one of which is the "danger creation" exception); Freeman, 911
[Vol. 54:1:165
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Accordingly, these courts hold state officials and municipali-
ties liable when the officials create situations in which some other
person or force brings about the plaintiffs harm. Though there is no
typical state-created danger case, a paradigmatic set of facts has
arisen in several circuits; a police officer arrests the driver of a car
and leaves the car's passengers to fend for themselves in a danger-
ous situation.5 6 In one case, police officers arrested a sober driver
and left behind her drunken passenger, who took the wheel and be-
came involved in a wreck that injured other motorists.5 7 The injured
motorists sued the officers under § 1983.58 Even though the court
recognized that the officers had no duty to protect the motorists
from drunk drivers, the officers' action of taking the sober driver
from the car created the danger that resulted in the plaintiffs' inju-
ries.59 Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs' allegations suffi-
ciently stated a claim that the officers had "deprived" them of their
constitutional rights.60
Currently, several federal circuits recognize the state-
created danger theory as a viable method of finding that the gov-
ernment has "deprived" a citizen of her constitutional rights.6 ' The
Second, 62 Third,63 Sixth,64 Seventh,65 Eighth,66 Ninth,67 Tenth,68 and
F.2d at 55 (stating that it is "clear" that at some point an official's actions in creating the danger
lead to a constitutional duty to protect the plaintiff); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1431
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding the County liable for preventing bystanders from rescuing a drowning
boy and stating, "[tihis is not a case like DeShaney").
56. See, e.g., Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs stated a
valid claim under the state-created danger theory when they alleged that police officers arrested
a sober driver and left in the vehicle her intoxicated passengers, who then attempted to drive
and injured the plaintiffs); Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting the
state-created danger theory is a second exception to the rule of DeShaney but refusing to hold an
officer liable for arresting the designated driver of intoxicated passengers later involved in
wreck); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that young plaintiffs properly
stated a claim when they alleged the police violated their constitutional rights for arresting their
uncle, who had been driving them, and left them on a busy highway to fend for themselves).
57. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1123-24. There was some dispute as to whether the driver was sober
or drunk. If she was sober, the court said, then the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim that the
officers had created the dangerous situation by removing the sober driver and leaving a drunk
passenger in her place at the wheel Id. at 1125-26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1125.
60. Id. at 1127.
61. E.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 356 (11th Cir.
1989).
62. Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99 (finding that plaintiffs properly stated a claim when they alleged
that police officers conspired with "skinheads" to permit them to beat up flagburners and there-
fore assisted in creating the plaintiffs' danger).
63. E.g., Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907-08 (3d Cir. 1997) (reminding
the parties that the court has "adopted the 'state-created danger' theory" but refusing to hold
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Eleventh 9 Circuits have accepted the theory and have held various
state actors and municipalities liable as a result.
There are, however, four circuits that have not yet recog-
nized the state-created danger theory.70 The First Circuit implicitly
school officials liable for leaving open a rear entrance to the school through which a private actor
entered and shot a teacher); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208-09 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
plaintiffs allegations that policemen arrested her companion and left her alone at night, intoxi-
cated, to walk home in the cold stated a claim under the state-created danger theory); D.R. v.
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373-74 (3d Cir. 1992) (acknowl-
edging the state-created danger theory as a viable mechanism to find liability but finding its
requirements unsatisfied in a situation in which school officials failed to protect students from
sexual harassment by other students).
64. E.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the City placed undercover police officers and their families in "special danger" by releasing their
personnel files such that officers could maintain a § 1983 action).
65. E.g., Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding a policeman liable
for revealing the identity of an informant who was later beaten and killed); Reed, 986 F.2d at
1125-26 (holding that plaintiffs stated a valid claim under the state-created danger theory when
they alleged that police officers arrested a sober driver and left her intoxicated passengers in the
vehicle, who then attempted to drive and injured the plaintiffs); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d
1422, 1424-25 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding deputy liable for preventing the private rescue of a
drowning boy); Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing the origin of the
state-created danger theory in the context of the government throwing a plaintiff into a "snake
pie' but not finding liability since the plaintiff alleged that the government merely failed to pro-
tect her); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382-83 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding the young plaintiffs
properly stated a claim when they alleged the police violated their constitutional rights for ar-
resting their uncle, who had been driving them, and left them on a busy highway to fend for
themselves).
66. E.g., Greer v. Shoop, 141 F.3d 824, 827 (Sth Cir. 1998) (acknowledging the validity of
the state-created danger theory but refusing to hold parole 'officers liable for failing to warn
decedent that the parolee placed in her home was infected with HIV); Doe v. Wright 82 F.3d 265,
268-69 (8th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a § 1983 claim under the state-created danger theory but re-
fusing to hold a sheriff and police department liable for failing to protect plaintiff from the sexual
harassment of one of its officers); Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010.12 (8th Cir.
1992) (noting the state-created danger theory is a second exception to the rule of DeShaney but
refusing to hold an officer liable for arresting the designated driver of intoxicated passengers
later involved in a wreck).
67. E.g., Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1058-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (reas-
serting the state-created danger exception to DeShaney but refusing to hold liable an off-duty
policeman involved in a barroom brawl); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring
plaintiff to show that fellow prison employee created the dangerous conditions in which she was
injured by an inmate in order to recover under § 1983).
68. E.g., Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch. Dist., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1998)
(emphasizing the validity of the state-created danger theory and then setting out a five-part test
to apply in such cases); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 571 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the
"danger creation" theory as the second exception to DeShaney).
69. Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 356-57 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing a
grant of summary judgment for defendants and remanding to the lower court to determine
whether prison officials were aware that a town clerk faced a special danger from work squad
inmates). But see White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that Cor-
nelius would not have survived the "shock the conscience" standard promulgated by Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)).
2001] POLICING THE POLICE
questioned whether the state-created danger theory should exist as
a method of finding state action.71 One First Circuit court noted
that not every negligent or even reckless state act that makes a
citizen more vulnerable to danger should be a constitutional viola-
tion.72 It opined that such a theory should be used cautiously, and
then decided to reach the merits on other grounds.73 The Fourth
Circuit explicitly rejected a state-created danger claim in Pinder v.
Johnson by noting that it is not a "second exception" to the rule of
DeShaney.74 Instead, the court noted that state-created danger is
simply an alternative way of finding liability when a state officer
directly causes harm to the plaintiff.7 5 Thus, in Pinder, a police offi-
cer was not liable when he promised to detain a man overnight who
had threatened to kill his ex-girlfriend and her children but then
released the man hours early.76 The Pinder court held that the gov-
ernment does not "create a danger" every time it takes some action
that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely.77
2. Lower Courts' Tests in Applying the State-Created Danger
Theory
Those circuits that recognize the state-created danger theory
as a method of finding that the government deprived a plaintiff of
her constitutional rights when some intervening source caused the
70. The First, Fourth, Fifth, and the District of Columbia Circuits have not yet recognized
the theory. The First and Fourth Circuits have done so explicitly, in Soto L. Flores, 103 F.3d
1056, 1064-65 (1st Cir. 1997), and Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1176 (4th Cir. 1995). The
Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits have not yet spoken on the issue.
71. Soto, 103 F.3d at 1064-65 (%Ve cannot extract a clearly established right from a some-
what confusing body of caselaw.").
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Absent the kind of custodial
relationship apparently contemplated by the Court, the Due Process Clause does not require the
State to protect citizens from 'private violence' in whatever form, including suicide. To be sure,
the complaint alleges numerous acts by appellants that undoubtedly rendered [the plaintiffa
more vulnerable .... However, these are not the kind of 'affirmative acts' by the State that
would give rise to a constitutional duty to protect.").
74. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1176 n.* C(Mt is not strictly accurate to suggest, as [plaintiffi does,
that 'creation of risk' is a second exception to the rule of DeShaney."). Instead, the court noted,
the "creation of danger" dicta of DeShaney more likely refers to those situations in which a state
actor "directly caused harm to the plaintiff." Id. (emphasis in original).
75. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1176 n.*.
76. The officer's promise caused the ex-girlfriend to go on to work that night, leaving her
children unprotected. After being released, the man returned to the house, set it on fire, and
killed the three children. Id. at 1172.
77. The court pointed out that the real "affirmative act" in Pinder was committed by the
released ex-boyfriend and not the officer who had promised to detain him. It did not matter, the
court stated, that the ex-girlfriend had relied on the officer's promises. Id. at 1175.
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plaintiffs harm employ various tests with often inconsistent factors
and results. 78 Courts typically consider five factors in determining
whether the plaintiff has properly alleged the state-created danger
theory: (1) whether the act was directed toward a specific plaintiff
or the public at large; (2) whether the government acted affirma-
tively or simply failed to act; (3) whether the government's act
caused the harm; (4) whether the government completely removed
all of the plaintiffs protection; and (5) whether the government
acted with the requisite culpability.7 9 Adding to the confusion, how-
ever, few courts consider all five factors,8 0 and even worse, no cir-
cuit agrees with any other as to what the five are or how they
should be evaluated. 81 Consequently, lower courts do not employ a
unified standard in determining how and when a state actor has
sufficiently created the danger in which a plaintiff is harmed and
fulfilled the "deprivation" requirement for § 1983 liability. The re-
sult is a series of state-created danger cases that demand a unified,
restrictive test based on inconsistent standards.
The following Section lists the factors that courts often con-
sider and includes a discussion of how the circuits struggle to define
and agree upon an appropriate analysis.
a. Specific Plaintiff or Public at Large
In order to impose liability, several circuits require that the
government's act create the danger for a specific plaintiff, as op-
posed to creating the danger for the general public.8 2 The require-
78. The Seventh Circuit, for example, once intimated that the government must have cut off
all avenues by which the plaintiff may have helped herself. See Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d
1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1990). However, eight years later, the court stated that there is "no absolute
requirement" that all avenues of self-help be restricted. Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 517 (7th
Cir. 1998).
79. See Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (giving a
complete list of the five factors).
80. E.g., Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
four elements); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1998) (discuss-
ing, at most, three elements); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d Cir. 1997)
(discussing only four elements to the test).
81. The Third and Tenth Circuits, for example, set out multi-part tests that are similar but
not quite the same. Compare Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating a four-
step test), with Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1264 (stating a five-step test). Moreover, other circuits dis-
cuss two or three of the factors but never explicitly set out a "test" for lower courts to follow.
E.g., Monfils, 165 F.3d at 516 ('[L]iability exists when the [S]tate affirmatively places a particu-
lar individual in a position of danger the individual would not otherwise have faced.") (internal
quotations omitted).
82. E.g., Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1264 (discussing whether the plaintiff was a member of a
"limited and specifically definable group"); Greer v. Sheep, 141 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1998)
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ment arises in part from two Supreme Court cases. In Martinez, the
Supreme Court refused to hold officials liable for prematurely re-
leasing a prisoner who then killed a young girl, because the parole
board "was not aware that [the girl], as distinguished from the
public at large, faced any special danger. 83 In DeShaney, young
Joshua was a "discrete, individual plaintiff;" therefore, some courts
have required the act to be directed toward an individual plaintiff
like Joshua in order to impose liability.8 4 Further, some courts state
that allowing liability when officials directed their acts toward the
public at large rather than toward a specific plaintiff expands the
scope of the state-created danger theory beyond "any reasonable
limit."8 5
The Seventh Circuit, however, has held that such a require-
ment is not necessary.8 6 In Reed v. Gardner, the court announced
that when the government creates an egregious danger, it does not
need to know who in particular will be hurt.87 The Reed court re-
fused to dismiss a § 1983 action against police officers who arrested
a designated driver and left behind her intoxicated passenger who
later drove the car into the plaintiffs car, killing the plaintiffs wife
and unborn son.88 Certainly, in arresting the designated driver, the
officers did not act toward the plaintiffs family specifically, but the
court found that because "some dangers are so evident . . . that
state actors can be held accountable by any injured party" even
though the specific-plaintiff requirement is not met.8 9 The Ninth
Circuit later intimated that the specific plaintiff requirement might
C[A]n individual's constitutional due process rights may be implicated when ... the IState af-
firmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger.") (internal quotations omitted);
Davis v. Fulton County, 90 F.3d 1346, 1351 (8th Cir. 1996) CFor such a duty to arise, the actions
of the [S]tate must create a unique risk of harm to the plaintiff that is greater than the risk faced
by the general public.").
83. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,285 (1980).
84. Although the Court in DeShaney did not hold the DSS liable, the Court did intimate
that the DSS would have been liable had it made Joshua more vulnerable. DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989). For this reason, lower courts have
cited DeShaney as precedent in requiring the victim to be a "discrete, individual plaintiff like
Joshua. See also Morse, 132 F.3d at 910, 913-14 (noting that the school district could not have
foreseen the injury).
85. E.g., Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1262 (CDW]e must bear in mind.., the need for restraining and
defining the scope of substantive due process claims.. . . "); Morse, 132 F.3d at 913 n.12; Mark v.
Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995) (fWhen the alleged unlawful act is a policy
directed at the public at large... the rationale behind the (danger creation] rule disappears.").
86. Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1123.
89. Id. at 1127.
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For the government to be liable under the state-created dan-
ger theory, almost all courts require that the official act affirma-
tively as opposed to refusing to act.91 This requirement arises from
DeShaney's holding that the Due Process Clause does not require
the government to provide any services; therefore, the government
cannot be held liable for failing to protect an individual against pri-
vate violence. 92 The distinction between action and inaction, how-
ever, can become a verbal tug-of-war in almost any case, because at
some point in the story, the government almost always acts af-
firmatively in some way.93 Even in DeShaney, the majority and dis-
sent disagreed on whether the DSS's act was affirmative. 94 The dis-
sent argued that the Court should "focus on the action that [the
DSS] has taken with respect to Joshua" and find that the affirma-
tive act was returning Joshua to his father. 95 The majority, how-
ever, construed the DSS's act as an omission and implied that
Joshua's father committed the real affirmative act.96
Not surprisingly, lower courts' analyses in distinguishing an
act from an omission are as conflicting and confusing as the major-
90. Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Our sister
circuits disagree as to whether the danger-creation exception applies only when the danger cre-
ated... is directed toward a particular plaintiff... [or] the general public.").
91. E.g., Kafistrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998) (clarifying that
the State may not have an affirmative duty to protect citizens for causing or increasing risks
through affirmative acts); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1375 (3d Cir. 1992) CLiability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the
[S]tate's affirmative acts which work to plaintiffs detriment in terms of exposure to danger.").
92. In the "special relationship" theory, the second theory enunciated in DeShaney, the gov-
ernment is liable for the harm to a plaintiff who is in the government's custody. DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). The affirmative act require-
ment under this theory is satisfied when the government takes the plaintiff into custody. Id.
For the state-created danger theory, however, the affirmative act is not as clear. Seemingly, the
Court would require some act by the government in order to find liability and would not allow
liability for an omission. Id. at 201.
93. Id. at 203-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (analyzing prior cases in light of the affirmative
act requirement and stating, "I am unable to see ... a neat and decisive line between action and
inaction").
94. Id. at 203, 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 202 (stating that because the DSS had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua
from his father, its failure to do so did not constitute a due process violation).
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ity and dissent in DeShaney.97 In two similar cases of domestic
abuse occurring after the police released incarcerated men who
were estranged from their families, the courts reached different
outcomes based on whether the police had acted affirmatively in
some way or merely failed to act.98 In Freeman u. Ferguson, the
court found that the plaintiffs original complaint did not state a
claim, because she had merely alleged that the police failed to pro-
tect her from her estranged husband.99 Her amended pleadings did
state a claim, however, because she alleged that the police chief in-
terfered with other officers in their desire to protect her. 0  In
Pinder v. Johnson, the police promised the plaintiff that her ex-
boyfriend would be detained overnight yet released him almost im-
mediately, allowing him to return to the plaintiffs trailer and burn
it down with her children inside. 10 1 Yet, the Pinder court held that
the officers' conduct was merely an omission and not a valid § 1983
claim, even though the plaintiff had emphasized in her complaint
the police officer's affirmative acts, including his assurances to the
plaintiff that the ex-boyfriend would not be released and the subse-
quent release of her ex-boyfriend. 102 The court refused to hold the
officer liable because "no amount of semantics" could disguise the
fact that the ex-boyfriend and not the police committed the real
act.103 The Pinder dissent, however, focused on the officer's act of
inducing the plaintiff to return to work and not to remain at home
to protect her children as affirmatively creating the danger in
which the plaintiff was injured.1°4 Thus, despite the Pinder major-
ity's desire to see the affirmative act requirement in a neat frame-
work,10 5 the semantic dispute remains unresolved.
At least one court has opted to ignore the action versus inac-
tion distinction. In White v. Rochford, in which police left children
97. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979) (hesitating to base police officers'
liability on the "tenuous metaphysical construct which differentiates sins of omission [from]
commission" when the officers arrested the children's uncle, who had been their driver, and left
them alone in an abandoned car on a busy freeway).
98. Compare Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiff would
state a claim if she alleged that the police chief affirmatively increased the decedents risk of
being attacked by her estranged husband); with Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding that the only affirmative act was that committed by the plaintiffs ex-boyfriend).
99. Freeman, 911 F.2d at 55.
100. Id. Plaintiffs amended complaint alleged that her husband was a good friend of the po-
lice chief, who directed other officers not to stop the husband's abusive behavior. Id.
101. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
102. Id. at 1175.
103. Id.
104. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1180-81 (Russell, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1176 n*.
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stranded on a highway after arresting their uncle, the court refused
to base the City's liability on the "tenuous metaphysical construct
which differentiates sins of omission and commission."' 10 6 In con-
cluding that the officers did indeed "act," the court noted that there
was little difference in affirmatively dumping the children out on
the highway and failing to take care of them knowing they were
stranded there. 10
7
Thus, the affirmative action requirement from DeShaney has
resulted in most courts acknowledging its existence but struggling
incessantly in its application.
c. Causation
At some point in each state-created danger case, the court
discusses causation; that is, each court requires that the govern-
ment's act be the cause of the plaintiffs injury, even though a third
party intervened, in order for the government to be found liable. 108
Courts are generally mindful of the causation requirement simply
because a § 1983 suit is quite similar to a basic tort suit.109 Yet, the
circuits do not seem to agree on what exactly a plaintiff must show
in order to prove causation.
Some lower courts speak of a plaintiffs harm as being "too
remote" from the government's act to meet the causation require-
ment.10 The genesis of this requirement is the Supreme Court's
Martinez opinion.' The Supreme Court held that the young girl's
death was too remote from the parole board's act of wrongly re-
leasing the killer some five months earlier. 112 Similarly, and per-
haps redundantly," 3 courts often require the government's act to be
106. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979).
107. Id. The dissent argued that the real affirmative act was the uncle's illegal drag-racing
that caused the children to be stranded, but the majority found that the officers had acted af-
firmatively by removing the driver from the car. Id. at 386.
108. E.g., Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch. Dist., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).
109. Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (lst Cir. 1997) (comparing and discussing §
1983 causation with ordinary tort law causation).
110. E.g., id.; Doe v. Wright, 82 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the government's
action was "too remote" to create a § 1983 claim).
111. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980).
112. Id. at 284. Following Martinez, the First Circuit dismissed a claim against police offi-
cers for failing to detain the victim's brother, who stabbed the victim two weeks after his release.
Rodriguez.Cirilo, 115 F.3d at 52. The court explained that the brother's stabbing was "too re-
mote" from the wrongful release to impose liability on the officers. Id.




the "proximate cause" of the plaintiffs harm.11 4 Most likely, the dif-
ference between "too remote" and "proximate cause" is minor, if it
exists at all, because the analysis is generally the same-whether a
tort-like analysis would find the government's act to be the cause of
the plaintiffs injury.15
Other courts avoid terms like "proximate" and "remote" and
vaguely imply a causation requirement by demanding that the gov-
ernment's act create the danger or increase the victim's vulnerabil-
ity to danger.116 In other words, the government's act must be the
but-for cause that put the plaintiff in a position of danger she would
not otherwise have faced.117 Part of the confusion about causation
derives from DeShaney, which never explicitly stated how large a
role the state actor must play in the creation of the danger or vul-
nerability.118 DeShaney, however, made one thing clear: the offi-
cial's act must in some way place the plaintiff in a worse position
than one which she would have occupied had the official not acted
at all.119 For Joshua DeShaney, it meant that the DSS's act of re-
turning him to his abusive father was in no way the cause of his
beating, because Joshua would have suffered the same fate had the
DSS never taken Joshua away from his father in the first place. 120
Thus, many courts appear to engage only in a but-for causa-
tion analysis and merely require that the government's act in some
way create or increase the plaintiffs danger. For example, in Reed,
liability turned on whether a car's driver, whom police officers ar-
rested, was drunk or sober. 121 If the driver were already drunk, the
court said, the officer's action of arresting her and leaving the in-
114. E.g., Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) C[Ihe
policy must be the proximate cause of the § 1983 injury"); Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159
F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998) C'Defendants conduct put Plaintiff at substantial risk of seri-
ous, immediate, and proximate harm .... ").
115. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1180-81 (4th Cir. 1995) (Russell, J., dissenting). A
tort-like analysis of proximate cause would require the plaintiffs injury to be a foreseeable con-
sequence of the government's act. Compare Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1059 (discussing "proximate"
causation in terms of "foreseeability), with Rodriguez-Cirilo, 115 F.3d at 52 (stating that the
cause is "remote" even if the officers had "some indication" of the later third party act).
116. E.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990). But see MW. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 122 (9th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that the governmenes act must ha%e created the danger and not simply rendered the plain-
tiff more vulnerable to an already-existing one).
117. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text. "But-for" causation employs a test that
asks whether the plaintiff would not have suffered any wrong "but for" the defendant's act.
BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1998).
118. Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1996).
119. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
120. Id. at 201.
121. Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993).
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toxicated passengers did not place the by-stander plaintiffs in a po-
sition of danger they would not have otherwise faced.122 If, however,
the driver were sober, then the arrest did cause the accident be-
cause it would never have occurred had the officers not acted.
123
Another court refused to find police officers liable when they failed
to assist a drunken man lying next to the road. 124 The officer's act,
said the court, did not create the danger by which the man was in-
jured because he was already drunk.125 Accordingly, under this but-
for causation analysis, a court will not find the government liable if
the official's act did little more than allow a plaintiff to be injured
by an already-existing danger.
126
d. Removing All Protection
A fourth element that courts consider is whether or not the
government's act removed all of the plaintiffs' protection, including
their self-protection. 2 7 Particularly, some courts require the plain-
tiff to show that when the government created the dangerous situa-
tion, it removed all of her sources of private aid. 128 Courts often
analogize from DeShaney's "special relationship" theory, in which
the government is liable only for injury that the plaintiff in the gov-
122. Id. The original driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 1124. It was
not clear, however, if she was actually intoxicated or was only presumed to be. Id, The court
decided to pursue the § 1983 analysis under both hypotheticals. Id. That is, the court first as-
sumed the truth of the plaintiffs' allegations-that the first driver was sober-and analyzed
causation. Id. Then, because the defendants on remand would likely offer proof of the driver's
intoxication, the court also addressed whether arresting an intoxicated driver and leaving an
equally-intoxicated passenger affected the analysis. Id.
123. Id. at 1126.
124. Rogers v. City of Port Huron, 833 F. Supp. 1212, 1218-19 (E.D. Mich. 1993). But see
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding officers increased plaintiffs danger
by leaving her in an intoxicated state to walk home on a cold night alone after arresting the
plaintiffs sober friend).
125. Rogers, 833 F. Supp. at 1219.
126. E.g., Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 309-310 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the City not l-
able for declining assistance from a SWAT team and taking a hard line with a hostage taker);
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding officers not liable be.
cause they "did not create but merely failed to avert danger" by not rescuing victims more
promptly from a burning car).
127. E.g., Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to hold of-
ficers liable for leaving drunk passengers in their car, because the officers never fully prevented
the designated driver from making "suitable arrangements" for the passengers); Ross v. United
States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that a deputy removed all aid to a drowning
boy when the deputy prevented bystanders from entering the water and saving him).
128. Ross, 910 F.2d at 1430.
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ernment's custody,129 and demand the plaintiff in a state-created
danger case allege a similar situation. That is, they require the
plaintiff to show that the government's act cut off all her aid and
effectively placed her in a helpless position as though she were in
custody.130 Several courts, however, do not discuss this requirement
at all, and at least one court has explicitly held that the govern-
ment need not remove all avenues of aid in order to find the state-
created danger theory applicable.' 3 ' In Monfils v. Taylor, the Sev-
enth Circuit held the City liable for releasing the identity of a police
informant who was later killed, even though the informant had
other ways to protect himself against his assailants.
13 2
e. Culpability
Finally, all courts require the state actor to have some level
of culpability regarding his act that led to the plaintiffs harm in
order for the government to be liable. 3 3 The Supreme Court clearly
announced in Daniels v. Williams that the Due Process Clause is
simply not implicated by an official's negligent act.'3 Further, the
Court announced in City of Canton v. Harris that "deliberate indif-
ference" is the standard necessary to establish § 1983 liability of a
municipality. 13 5 In light of these holdings, most courts require a
plaintiff to show that the government officer acted with deliberate
indifference to a known or obvious danger. 136
129. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) CThe af-
firmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or
from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his
freedom to act on his own behalf.").
130. E.g., Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1174-75 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying liability because
"[Plaintiff] was never incarcerated, arrested, or otherwise restricted in any way); Gregory, 974
F.2d at 1011 (pointing out that the officers' act of arresting the driver did not remove the passen-
gers' protection since the driver was across the street in the police station); Ross, 910 F.2d at
1431 (quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988)) CTWhen a State cuts
off sources of private aid, it must provide replacement protection.").
131. Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1998) CIn a claim such as this one based
on state-created danger, there is no absolute requirement that all avenues of self-help be re-
stricted.").
132. Id.
133. E.g., Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch. Dist., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1998);
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d Cir. 1997); Dwares v. City of New York,
985 F.2d 94, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1993).
134. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
135. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
136. E.g., Morse, 132 F.3d at 910; Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding it is not sufficient that state official was "grossly negligent"); Wood v.
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989). But see, Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1261-62 (stating that
the official must have acted "recklessly with conscious disregard" of the risk).
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
The definition of "deliberate indifference," however, varies
among courts as well. The Third Circuit explained that there is lit-
tle difference in the terms "deliberate indifference," "reckless disre-
gard," or "reckless indifference," and stated that "willful disregard"
fits also within the same category of mens rea. 137 Each standard
requires that the official's act fall somewhere between intent and
negligence. 138 Other circuits have defined "deliberate indifference"
as "recklessness not in a tort-law sense but in the appreciably
stricter criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowledge."
18 9
Despite the pervasive "deliberate indifference" standard, a
few circuits require different levels of culpability. The Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have promulgated a level of culpability that rings
of negligence. 140 In discussing whether the City was liable for re-
leasing undercover officers' personal information, a Sixth Circuit
court stated that the City "either knew or clearly should have
known" that such an act would greatly increase the officers' risk of
danger.'4 ' Perhaps in an attempt to raise the level of culpability
beyond negligence, the Second Circuit has required that the state
actor's culpability be as high as "intentional and malicious." 142 Fi-
nally, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a much higher standard, re-
quiring § 1983 plaintiffs to show that the government acted in a
manner that "shocks the conscience." 48 The requirement derives
137. 'Willful disregard," the court noted, is not to imply that the act be intentional; rather,
the act must have been made in light of a known or obvious risk. Morse, 132 F.3d at 910, n.10;
see also Davis v. Fulton County, 90 F.3d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the plaintiff
failed to make a "showing of recklessness or of deliberate intent').
138. The Third Circuit cited the willful indifference test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which requires that the, actor "knows or has reason to know of circumstances which would bring
home to the realization of the ordinary, reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his
conduct." Morse, 132 F.3d at 910.
139. L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1996); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574
(10th Cir. 1995) (the standard "requires the defendant to act recklessly in conscious disregard of
a substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm ... which occurs when the defen-
dant recognizes the unreasonable risk and actually intends to expose the plaintiff to such risks");
Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that a deliberate indif-
ference standard requires the defendant to have had a culpable state of mind and intended wan-
tonly to inflict pain).
140. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1998); Reed v. Gardner,
986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993) ('[A] jury could reasonably draw the inference that police
officers knew or should have known that car passengers were intoxicated"); see also White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (using a standard of gross negligence or reckless
disregard for the safety of others).
141. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1067.
142. See Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing to the plaintiffs
complaint and ruling that such an allegation is sufficient).
143. Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 571; see also Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch. Dist., 159 F.3d 1253,
1261 (10th Cir. 1998); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996).
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from the Supreme Court's language in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights in which the Court stated that the City's deliberate indif-
ference to the plaintiffs safety must "shock the conscience of federal
judges."' 44 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the substance of the
requirement to mean that the plaintiff must demonstrate a degree
of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential harm that is "truly
conscience shocking."' 4
III. A SINGLE RESTRICTIVE TEST TO CONFINE THE STATE-
CREATED DANGER THEORY TO APPROPRIATE CASES
Because no two circuits employ the same test in analyzing
state-created danger cases and because some circuits do not even
have an established test, § 1983 plaintiffs confront an arduous task
in simply filing their complaints. Moreover, many of the current
standards expand § 1983 liability and allow federal judges to sec-
ond-guess decisions better left to government actors. 46 In response
to this confusion and uncertainty, this Note argues for a simple,
restrictive five-part test that federal courts should require plaintiffs
to meet in state-created danger cases: (1) the government acted af-
firmatively; (2) toward a specific plaintiff, (3) with deliberate indif-
ference; (4) causing the harm; (5) in a way that shocks the con-
science of the court.
A. The Recommended Test
1. Affirmative Act
First, a plaintiff must prove that the state official affirma-
tively acted rather than that the official simply failed to act. 47 In
144. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
145. Seanons, 84 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574). The plaintiff in Scomons
was assaulted by various football teammates in the school locker room. Id& at 1230. The victim
then reported the incident to school officials, including the coach, who dismissed him from the
team for "betraying" the others. Id. The school district later responded to the whole incident by
canceling the final game of the season. Id. Immediately following this response, the plaintiff
alleged that he became subject to "a hostile environment" for being the "cause of the team's de-
mise" Id The plaintiff then sued, alleging that the schools impotent responses to his original
complaint violated his constitutional rights under § 1983. The court disagreed, noting that the
school's responses were, at most, merely negligent and did not rise to the level of§ 1983 liability.
Id. at 1230-31. The court noted in another case, Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574, that the "shocks the
conscience" standard is not precisely defined but, at the least, requires a "high level of outra-
geousness." Id.
146. See infra Part IV.B.2.
147. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
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DeShaney, the Supreme Court made clear that the Due Process
Clause does not "impose an affirmative obligation on the State" to
protect the lives, liberties, or properties of its people. 14 8 Therefore,
even if the official refuses to provide protective services that could
avert injuries, the government cannot be held liable under § 1983
because inaction simply does not state a valid claim. 149 Since De-
Shaney, judges have struggled with and commentators have criti-
cized the action/inaction distinction, many noting that a different
outcome could result depending on which point in the story the
court focuses. 150
Nevertheless, despite the difficulty in assessing the affirma-
tive action requirement, DeShaney still stands; thus, courts should
consider three points in analyzing whether the affirmative action
requirement is met.1 1 First, and most obvious, a court must require
that the government have acted in some way.152 This is not the end
of the inquiry since it is true that inaction can be recharacterized as
148. Id. at 195-96. The Court has held that an affirmative duty to protect may arise when
the government restrains a person from acting on his own behalE Id. at 199-200.
149. Id. at 196-97. Such a holding is consistent with the Coures traditional concept of the
Due Process Clause, which has long since been to view it as a charter of negative liberties, See
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 (1972). But see Lisa E. Heinzerling, Actionable Inaction:
Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 1048, 1064-66 (1986) (arguing that
when the government induces reliance, the case should be treated as an action case rather than
an inaction one).
150. Even in DeShaney, for example, the majority characterized the case as one of inaction,
because the DSS had no duty to protect young Joshua from his father. The dissent, on the other
hand, focused on the DSS's act of returning Joshua to his father. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
96; see also supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. The problem is not confined to the Su-
preme Court. Lower courts have struggled with the distinction. Compare Pinder v. Johnson, 54
F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the police did not act affirmatively when they released
a mother's estranged boyfriend who later killed her children, because the real affirmative act
was that committed by boyfriend), with Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1180-81 (Russell, J., dissenting)
(finding the release an affirmative act); see also Melinda J. Seeds, Throwing Out the Baby with
the Bathwater: The Fourth Circuit Rejects a State Duty of Affirmative Protection in Pinder v.
Johnson, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1750 (1996) (noting that various commentators have criticized
"the vague distinction" between action and inaction); Julie Shapiro, Snake Pits and Unseen Ac-
tors: Constitutional Liability of Indirect Harm, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 883, 916 (1994) (pointing out
that Justices Brennan and Blackmun noted in DeShaney that there was no "real" difference
between action and inaction cases).
151. It is well beyond the scope of this Note to explore all considerations in analyzing the ac-
tion/inaction requirement. Most likely, a court will view a case as being one of "inaction,"
meaning the State failed to act, or one of "action," meaning the State affirmatively acted suffi-
cient to find liability, based on the point in the story which the parties' skilled attorneys empha.
size. See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (initially viewing the
plaintiffs claim as one of inaction, then shifting analysis to the action taken by the government
and considering whether the government created the danger and could be liable under that the-
ory); Shapiro, supra note 150, at 916.
152. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
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action; therefore, courts should consider only those acts occurring in
the context of immediate interactions between the state actor and
the plaintiff.153 Finally, a court must require that the government's
act toward the plaintiff did more than simply return the plaintiff to
a danger that already existed. 5
4
2. Specific Plaintiff or Specific Group of Plaintiffs
A plaintiff must also show that the government directed its
act toward a specific plaintiff or group of plaintiffs, rather than to-
ward the public at large. The Supreme Court clearly enunciated
such a requirement in Martinez, in which a parole board wrongfully
released a prisoner, who later killed a young girl.155 The Court re-
fused to hold the parole board liable, because the board's act was
not directed toward the victim specifically.1 6 Further, only a spe-
cific-plaintiff requirement comports with the Supreme Court's an-
nounced culpability requirements, which demand that a plaintiff
show that the official acted "deliberately indifferent in a way that
shocks the conscience." 15 7 The only way a plaintiff could possibly
meet this culpability element is by showing that the state official
acted toward a specific plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.158
153. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1176 n.* (finding that the ex-boyfriend committed the affirmative act
and not the officers who released him from jail). The immediacy of the interaction is relative, but
a court should consider the remoteness in time between the governments act and its effect on
the plaintiff For an extensive evaluation of the actionlinaction cases, see Shapiro, supra note
150, at 917-44. Professor Shapiro suggests five actionlinaction categories in which any case
could fit and then concludes that only two such categories would likely find success under § 1983
as true action cases.
154. See, e.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring that the
governments act created the danger or rendered the plaintiff more vulnerable to a danger rather
than simply returning the plaintiff to one that already existed); LW. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119,
121 (9th Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990). This final point is
itself a step in the recommended test and will be analyzed more carefully infra Part I.A.4(b).
155. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
156. See id. at 285. The Court also stated that the board's act was too remote from the vic-
tim's death to warrant liability. Id. at 284.
157. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (quoting Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). The "shocks the conscience" standard is discussed more fully,
infra Part II.A.5.
158. For example, the court in Uhtrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995), required
that the plaintiff allege a "constitutionally cognizable danger," which is one that "shocks the
conscience" and requires a high degree of culpability. The only way such a level of culpability
could be reached is if the government directed its act toward a specific plaintiff or group of plain-
tiffs. Similarly, the Court in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-36 (1986), held that the Due
Process Clause is not implicated by a negligent act, implying that a state actor must intend to
harm a given plaintiff The assumption underlying the intent requirement could be that the act
must be directed at a specific plaintiff Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of CaL, 551 P.2d 334,342-43




Third, a plaintiff must prove that the state official acted with
deliberate indifference. Though the Supreme Court has never ex-
plicitly enunciated a culpability standard for state-created danger
cases, it has clearly rejected negligence as sufficient for stating a
claim against actors in a due process context. 1 9 The Court has,
however, used the "deliberate indifference" standard in two differ-
ent contexts that are both closely related to state-created danger.
First, the Court held that "deliberate indifference" is the necessary
level of culpability to prove a cruel and unusual punishment claim,
a claim often arising under the "special relationship" theory enun-
ciated in DeShaney.160 Second, the Court announced that the "delib-
erate indifference" standard is the level of culpability needed to find
municipalities liable under § 1983.161 The reason for this level of
culpability, the Court stated, is to ensure that the government is
the "moving force behind the constitutional violation."1 62
Thus, following the Supreme Court's lead, lower courts
should require the plaintiff to show that the state actor or munici-
pality acted with deliberate indifference to her rights. 163 Essen-
tially, to meet the standard, the government official's actions must
display a willingness to ignore a foreseeable danger or risk, evinc-
ing that the official acted even though he was substantially certain
that a harm would occur. 64 Thus, a court should require the plain-
"special relationship" between the plaintiff and defendant and implying that a harm is "foresee-
able" only if the specific plaintiff is known).
159. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 C'[Tihe Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negli-
gent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property."). With
higher stakes available in § 1983 claims and without the protection of sovereign immunity, a
higher level of culpability seems justified. Id. at 332 (Far from an abuse of power, lack of due
care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.').
160. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
161. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Bryan County v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (holding that to prove a due process violation, a plaintiff must show that
"the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious conse-
quences"). But see Collins, 503 U.S. at 115 (implying that conduct must "shock the conscience" in
order to state a valid § 1983 claim). It seems more logical, however, that the "shocks the con-
science" standard applies to a level of deference the judiciary should observe in evaluating a §
1983 claim and not the level of culpability the state actor evinced. Id. at 124 (noting the relevant
consciences are those of federal judges).
162. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
163. See Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 435, 480 (1994) (arguing that in the state-created danger context, the appropriate
culpability standard should be deliberate indifference).
164. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 910 n.10 (3d Cir.1997) (discussing the
particularities of the "deliberate indifference" standard); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 500 (1965) (noting that an actor is "willfully indifferent" when he acts "knowing or hay-
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tiff to show more than that the state official acted negligently, but
less than that the official actually intended the harm to occur.1
4. Causation
As in ordinary tort law, 166 a plaintiff suing under the state-
created danger theory must prove that the government's act caused
her injury. In a state-created danger case, a private party or force
intervened after the government's act; therefore, the issue of causa-
tion almost always becomes the focus of the court's analysis.1i6 The
plaintiffs final aim is to prove that the government's act created
the danger in which she was injured or made her more vulnerable
to an already-existing danger.168 In considering this final aim, a
court should break the causation analysis down into three steps.
a. Government's Act Did Not Return Plaintiff to
Already-Existing Danger
The preliminary question a court must answer is whether
the danger already existed. If the danger to the plaintiff already
existed, and the official's act did not make matters worse, then the
government is not liable. 169 In DeShaney, for example, Joshua's
danger was his abusive father. The Court refused to hold the DSS
liable because by returning Joshua to the hands of his father, the
DSS "played no part in [the dangers'] creation, nor did it do any-
thing to render him any more vulnerable to them."170 Thus, a plain-
tiff does not state a claim when she alleges that the government
released a person who then harmed the plaintiff, when the person's
ing reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize... that his conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another"); see also Blum, supra note 163, at 480
CDeliberate indifference would be established by showing that a defendant consciously acted or
chose not to act with knowledge of the obvious consequences of this conduct.").
165. In the cruel and unusual punishment context, the Supreme Court described the "delib-
erate indifference" standard as one higher than mere negligence, one that "offends evolving
standards of decency" and constitutes an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" on the
prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 n.14.
166. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 282 (5th ed. 1992) (stating that a defendant does not have to compensate a plain-
tiff unless the defendanfs negligent act caused the plaintiffs injury).
167- Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (focusing on a causation analysis in deter-
mining whether the State "deprived" the decedent of her constitutional rights); Thomas A. Eaton,
Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L REV. 443, 479 (1982) (encouraging courts to focus
on causation in the state-created danger context).
168. Nearly all courts agree to such an aim. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
169. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
170. Id.
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intent to kill or injure already existed' 71 There are times, however,
when the danger already exists, but the government is liable for
making the dangerous situation worse. 172 For example, a plaintiff
states a claim if she shows that the government interfered with pri-
vate citizens who attempted to help her."73 Therefore, if the danger
to the plaintiff did not exist before the government's act, or the gov-
ernment acted in some way that rendered the plaintiff more vul-
nerable to the danger, then the court must move on to the next step
in the causation analysis to determine whether the government is
liable.174
b. Government's Act Was Not "Too Remote"
If the danger did not already exist or the government made
the plaintiff more vulnerable to an already-existing danger, the
plaintiff must then show that the government's act was the "proxi-
mate" cause of, or not "too remote" from, her injury.175 The Supreme
Court announced in Martinez that the plaintiffs injury must not be
"too remote a consequence" from the government's act in order to
find § 1983 liability. 76 As in the common law of tort, a court should
analyze "proximate" or "remote" in terms of foreseeability. 177 While
171. E.g., Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283-85 (wrongly releasing parolee who then murdered victim
does not state a claim); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-77 (1995) (releasing ex-boyfriond
who then set fire to plaintiffs home killing her children does not state claim).
172. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
173. Ross v. Lake County, 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) (validating a claim based on an offi-
cial's interference with the private rescue of a drowning boy); Estate of Sinthasomphone v, City
of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (alleging that officers interference with
private rescue of Jeffrey Dahmer's victim states valid claim).
174. Liability does not attach simply because the danger did not exist before the govern.
menes act. Arguably, the danger did not exist to the victim in Martinez before the parole board
released the killer; however, the Supreme Court refused to hold the board liable in Martinez
because its act was so far removed from the eventual harm that the Court found it did not create
the danger, nor make the victim more vulnerable to it. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
284-85 (1980). Similarly, if the government's act rendered a plaintiff more vulnerable to an
already-existing danger, then the court should move on to the next steps in the causation analy-
sis to determine whether the government acted "too remotely" in relation to the plaintiffs harm
to preclude liability.
175. A proper causation analysis includes first deciding that the danger did not already exist
and then moving on to discuss proximate cause, effectively combining the holdings of DeShaney
and Martinez.
176. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285.
177. E.g., Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that "the deputy's intervening 'private acts' were 'unforeseeable' "); Van Ort v. Stanewich, 92
F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996) ('the County could not reasonably have foreseen that Stanewich
would become a free-lance criminal"); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1987) ("pol-
icy [is] a proximate cause ... if it were 'within the scope of the original risk' and therefore fore-
seeable"); see also Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285 (stating that since the final danger to the plaintiff
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"foreseeability" is not completely concrete,17 8 courts are familiar
with the concept from common law tort and should apply a similar
analysis. For example, a plaintiffs injury is foreseeable if the gov-
ernment actor expected both the type of harm and the manner in
which it occurred.17 9
c. Government's Act Removed All Avenues of Protection
Finally, in proving causation a plaintiff must show that the
government's act removed all of her avenues of protection. That is,
the plaintiff must prove that the state actor prevented her from
helping herself or stopped others from helping her. Two main rea-
sons support such a strict requirement. First, this view greatly con-
fines § 1983 liability because in many of the cases in which liability
has been found, the official did not remove all of the plaintiffs pro-
tection. 180 Confining government liability is imperative in light of
the serious stance the Supreme Court has taken against arbitrarily
using § 1983 as a means of bypassing sovereign immunity and sec-
ond-guessing government decisions and resource allocations. 181 Sec-
occurred some five months after the government's act, no officer could be "aware" that the harm
would have occurred).
178. Justice Andrews noted that proximate cause is a matter of "practical politics." Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting); see also
Heinzerling, supra note 149, at 1058 (arguing that the "absence of foreseeable harm to a par-
ticular individual does not necessarily show a lack of proximate causation").
179. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 166, at 353; see also RESTrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 435 (1965) ('The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another
where after the event and looking back from the harm [to the act], it appears to the court highly
extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.").
180. For example, the police in Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993), as-
sured a small crowd that they would not intervene if the crowd wished to attack nearby flag-
burners. Dwares, 985 F.2d at 96-97. If the court had required the flagburners to show the police
removed all their protection, then the police would not have been liable. The police did not pre-
vent the flagburners from protecting themselves--they did not confine them or prevent them
from leaving the area or fending off the attack; nor did the police prevent others from doing so as
well. I&. at 95-97. Compare Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding possi-
ble liability even though the police, in refusing to protect plaintiff from her husband, did not
prevent her from leaving town, protecting herself, or calling on others to protect her), with
Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the government in no way
incarcerated, institutionalized, or confined the plaintiff in a way that prevented her from pro-
tecting herselX and thus the government was not liable). A case properly considering this re-
quirement is Ross v. Lake County, 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the deputy's acts re-
moved all available help to a drowning boy, who was obviously unable to help himself. The cases
in which the plaintiff was left alone intoxicated are much more difficult to analyze. It could be
viewed, as by some courts, that by removing the intoxicated plaintiffs protection, the govern-
ment removed all available avenues of aid. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996).
181. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128-29 (1992); see alzo discussion infra
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ond, courts should consider the state-created danger theory in con-
junction with the special relationship theory because both derived
from DeShaney.18 2 In the special relationship theory, the govern-
ment is liable only when it has incarcerated or otherwise restrained
a person's liberty in such a way that she cannot care for herself.183
In the same way, only when a state official creates a danger by re-
moving all of a plaintiffs available aid, including methods of self-
protection, should the government be liable under the state-created
danger theory.184
5. The Overall Situation Shocks the Conscience of the Court
Finally, a plaintiff must show that the government's conduct
is so egregious as to "shock the conscience of federal judges."'185 The
Supreme Court announced this standard in order to avoid turning
any ordinary tort into a substantive due process violation action-
able under § 1983.186 The "shocks the conscience" standard requires
that the act be so "brutal and offensive that it did not comport with
traditional ideas of fair play and decency" and thus violated sub-
stantive due process. 187 Such a requirement is inevitably highly
subjective but would allow courts to defer to the decisions of gov-
ernment officials and properly confine § 1983 liability according to
Supreme Court precedent and the principle of separation of
powers. 188 Thus, a court adhering to the "shocks the conscience"
standard would confine state-created danger cases to those situa-
tions in which the government acted without a valid reason in an
egregious manner.189
182. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serves., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 199-200 (1989).
183. Id. at 200.
184. Eaton & Wells, supra note 50, at 145 (noting that some courts ask whether the relation.
ship between the government and the plaintiff "so resembled confinement in its effects on the
plaintiff as to justify recognition of an affirmative duty by analogy to the confinement principle,"
a question likely acceptable to the Supreme Court).
185. Collins, 503 U.S. at 126; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47
(1998) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)).
186. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
187. Id. (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957)).
188. Id.; see also infra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing Supreme Court reluctance regarding § 1983
liability, government freedom, and separation of powers).
189. Brief for City of Garland, et al., Amici Curiae, at 17-18, Piotrowski v. City of Houston
(1999) (arguing that a "shocks the conscience" criterion would prevent liability in cases in which
a government actor has "legitimate reasons" for acting).
[Vol. 54:1:165
POLIC1NG TrE POLICE
B. Application of the Recommended Test to Facts of Piotrowski v.
City of Houston
The simplicity and effectiveness of a unified, restrictive test
can be seen in its application to the facts of Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, in which Barbara Piotrowski sued the City for police offi-
cers' alleged involvement in her shooting by a private actor.'so First,
Piotrowski must prove the police affirmatively acted. Neither the
police's failure to warn Piotrowski nor the police's failure to protect
her constituted an affirmative act.191 If, however, the police worked
for Piotrowski's ex-boyfriend and supplied the gunman with her
photograph, then a court should rightfully find the affirmative act
requirement met.192
Second, Piotrowski must show that the police directed their
affirmative acts toward her specifically. The alleged acts involved
ransacking the plaintiffs apartment and providing the gunman
with her photo; therefore, they were most certainly specifically di-
rected toward her.
Third, Piotrowski must argue that the police acted with de-
liberate indifference; that is, the police officers, in acting toward
her specifically, ignored a foreseeable danger or risk even though
they were substantially certain that she would be harmed. Assum-
ing the police officers were aware that Piotrowski's ex-boyfriend
had hired a gunman to kill her, their acts clearly demonstrated de-
liberate indifference. If, however, the officers were unaware of any
such risk to the plaintiff, a court should not find the culpability re-
quirement met.
Piotrowski must next prove that the police's acts caused her
injury. It is in this crucial step that Piotrowski's case would fail.
First, the danger to her life existed despite the officers' acts because
her ex-boyfriend had previously tried to have her killed. 193 Piotrow-
190. See supra Introduction, Part I.
191. In this way, Piotrowski is similar to DeShaney. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989).
192. If such allegations are true, the police's acts of sabotaging plaintiffs car and apartment
and providing the gunman with her mugshot are both (1) acts done in an immediate interaction
between the plaintiff and police and (2) acts that rendered the plaintiff more vulnerable to the
gunman's danger. Even though these acts would meet the first steps in the analysis, the City of
Houston would not be liable because a city is liable for the acts of its employees only if the plain-
tiff can show the officers were following a city "policy or custom." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serva.,
436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
193. Not only had her ex-boyfriend beat her several times, but he had also offered other peo-




ski could argue that the police's acts of giving away her
photograph 94 and aiding her ex-boyfriend by threatening her ren-
dered her more vulnerable to the later attack. 195 The gunman, how-
ever, likely knew who Piotrowski was or, if not, could easily find an
available photo of her; therefore, giving the photograph to the gun-
man was arguably not even a "but-for" cause of her eventual injury.
Second, the police's acts were probably "too remote" from Piotrow-
ski's injury, because they occurred several days before the actual
shooting. Finally, the police officers' acts in no way removed all
avenues of protection from Piotrowski. She was at all times aware
of the violent tendencies of her ex-boyfriend and his desire to harm
her;196 the police did nothing to prevent her from protecting
herself.197 Certainly, the police's alleged acts did not create a situa-
tion analogous to Piotrowski's being incarcerated and unable to pro-
tect herself.198 If, however, Piotrowski did prevail on the causation
analysis, she must prove the overall actions of the police were con-
science shocking. Failing to warn or protect a citizen against a pri-
vate actor's harm does not rise to the level of a conscience-shocking
situation. 99 Certainly, the harm that befell Ms. Piotrowski is brutal
and detestable, but considering the acts of the Houston Police De-
partment in light of budgetary, time, and manpower restraints
should lead any judge to deny constitutional liability. 00
194. This act is hotly disputed. See supra note 12 (explaining that Piotrowski's only basis for
such an allegation is that a mugshot was found on the gunman).
195. Such an argument would closely parallel the one made in Dwares v. City of New York,
985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993), in which officers' reassurances to skinheads that the police would not
prevent an attack on flag-burners led to liability.
196. See supra note 9.
197. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (the police's refusal to detain ox-
boyfriend who later set home ablaze did not leave plaintiff without protection).
198. If, for example, the Houston police had actively prevented someone from warning an
unknowing Piotrowski of her boyfriend's plans or had taken away Piotrowski's handgun or had
arrested a bodyguard or had left her alone helpless in an area where the gunman was known to
be waiting, then this element would arguably be met. As it is, however, Piotrowski was in the
same position she would have been had the police not been involved at all.
199. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127-29 (1992) (holding that the City's
failure to provide warnings about the dangers of manholes or properly train its employees did
not rise to the level of conscience-shocking behavior when an employee died of asphyxia after
entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servo,,
489 U.S. 189, 189 (1989) ("[Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private aftors.").
200. Holding the City of Houston liable in this situation may mean liability for every police
officer and department who neglects, for whatever reason, to warn a citizen of an impending
harm by a third-party actor. See infra IV.B.2.
[Vol. 54:1:165
POLICING THE POLICE
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND GOVERNMENT
FREEDOM SUPPORT OF THE UNIFIED, NARROW APPROACH OF
THE RECOMMENDED TEST
The miscellaneous tests currently employed by the circuits
present an overwhelming array of standards dizzying to any poten-
tial § 1983 litigant or judge faced with a state-created danger
case.20 ' Moreover, since DeShaney, courts have expanded the state-
created danger theory beyond any reasonable application by gener-
alizing the plaintiff harmed,202 loosening the causation require-
ment,203 and lowering the culpability required of the state actor.2
Both the lack of unity and the need for confinement demand that
the Supreme Court clarify and create a unified standard that nar-
rows the state-created danger theory to appropriate cases.
A. Need for Unity
Adopting the recommended test is essential because the test
will provide a unified approach to all state-created danger cases.
Currently, depending on the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff
brings her § 1983 suit, a court will evaluate her claim under a
unique test and likely arrive at a different conclusion than if she
had brought the case in another court.20 5 For example, two courts
faced with almost identical facts reached different outcomes, ex-
pressly highlighting the need for a unified standard among
circuits.20 6 In each case, a police officer arrested a designated driver
201. E.g., Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) (dis-
cussing both the appropriate causation analysis required of a § 1983 suit as well as the dis-
agreement among "sister circuits" as to whether the state action must be directed toward a par-
ticular plaintiff or the public at large).
202. Supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
203. Supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
204. Supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
205. Compare Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998) (requiring
the plaintiff to show that the danger was created for her specifically), with Reed v. Gardner, 986
F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing plaintiff to prove that the entire public faced the dan-
ger). Compare Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) C'the real 'affirmative act
here was committed by [third party] and not by Officer Johnson"), with Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1180-
81 (Russell, J., dissenting) (I cannot understand how the majority can... not conclude that
Officer Johnson placed [plaintiff] and her children in a position of danger."), and White v.
Rochfird, 592 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1979) (asserting that the police officers' act of arresting the
driver and not the driver's act of drag-racing created the danger in which the plaintiffs were
injured).
206. Compare Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1992) (en bane)
(holding that officer who arrested a designated driver did not have a duty to protect the driver's
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and left intoxicated passengers, who then took the wheel and
caused an accident. 20 7 The Seventh Circuit stated that if the ar-
rested driver were sober, then the officers created the dangerous
situation that allowed the drunk passenger to injure the plaintiffs,
and the officers should be liable.20 8 The Eighth Circuit, however,
announced that even though the arrested driver was sober, the offi-
cers did not have a duty to care for the intoxicated passengers left
behind, and therefore the officers were not liable. 209 Thus, the Su-
preme Court should adopt the recommended test simply to help al-
leviate chaos among the circuits. 210
B. Need for Confinement
In addition, the recommended test is crucial in confining li-
ability under the state-created danger theory. Many of the circuits'
current tests employ loose requirements that allow liability under
questionable circumstances and have led to a deluge of lawsuits
against cities and their employees. 211 By generalizing the plaintiff
harmed,212 lowering the standard of culpability to negligence, 213 and
requiring only but-for causation, 214 courts have increased the prob-
ability of government liability.215
Eliminating the state-created danger theory altogether,
however, is not a viable option. Even though the Fourth Circuit has
intoxicated passengers), with Reed, 986 F.2d at 1126-27 (finding that the plaintiff stated a claim
against officers who left intoxicated passengers after arresting their driver).
207. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1123; Gregory, 974 F.2d at 1006.
208. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125, 1127-28.
209. Gregory, 974 F.2d at 1012.
210. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serves., 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989) (answer-
ing the question of when a governments failure to provide services violates a citizen's rights
because of "the inconsistent approaches taken by the lower courts"); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 329 (1986) (answering the question of when tortious conduct by state officials rises to
the level of a constitutional tort because of "the inconsistent approaches taken by lower courts").
211. A recent article noted that cities in the Ninth Circuit have faced a "deluge of suits" as a
result of the decision in Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, the City of
Honolulu has claimed that Wood has forced it into "sizable" settlements in three state-created
danger suits involving domestic disputes that resulted from violations of court-imposed re-
straining orders. Nathan Koppel, Cities Fear "State-Created Danger" Suits, TEXAS LAWYER, Dec.
13, 1999, at 1, 19.
212. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127.
213. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1998).
214. Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).
215. The Texas Municipal League claims that a careless state-created danger test could lead
to state liability when a dispatcher blunders a 911 call or a city fails to evacuate coastal resi-
dents during a hurricane. See Koppel, supra note 211, at 19.
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called the theory "not a true exception to the rule of DeShaney," 216
the theory is simply too well established to be completely
abolished.217 Moreover, the Supreme Court in DeShaney clearly in-
timated that if the government plays a part in the creation of the
danger in which a plaintiff is injured, then liability should follow. 218
Even critics of the state-created danger theory cannot ignore this
statement. In addition, when the government puts a person in a
position of danger from private actors and then fails to protect the
person, the government is justifiably "as much an active tortfeasor
as if it had thrown [the person] into a snake pit."219 On a policy
level, allowing liability under the state-created danger theory en-
courages the government to act more carefully, causes the costs of a
victim's injury to be spread out among all taxpayers, and creates a
higher respect for a law that holds government actors
accountable.2 0
Thus, the state-created danger theory is viable and neces-
sary on some level. Yet, a look at the Supreme Court's view of §
1983 reveals a serious unwillingness to expand liability. Moreover,
the need for governmental bodies to freely make decisions regard-
ing resource allocation supports limiting liability. It is therefore
critical that courts adopt the recommended test in order to ensure
greater governmental accountability while also confining recovery
and protecting legislative decisions.
1. Supreme Court Precedent Supports a Narrow Application of the
State-Created Danger Theory
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the
state-created danger theory, its precedent indicates a hesitancy to
allow recovery under § 1983 at all.22' The Court has limited liability
216. Supra notes 71-74; see also Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1176 n* (4th Cir. 1995)
(dismissing claims against the government when a private party intervened to cause the harm).
217. E.g., Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066; Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 516-18 (7th Cir.
1998); Greer v. Shoop, 141 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1998); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201
(3d Cir. 1996); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 571-72 (10th Cir. 1995); Dwares v. City of New
York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); LW. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992).
218. DeShaneyv. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
219. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
220. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650, 651 (1980) (holding that a dam-
ages remedy is a "vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guaran-
tees"); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) (postulating that deter-
rence is a more impdrtant policy goal than compensation).
221. See Mead, supra note 28, at 519 n.8. Mead notes that Congress originally intended the
Civil Rights Act, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to extend beyond the immediate problems-post-Civil
War racial tensions-in the South to provide recovery for all people whose constitutional rights
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under § 1983 in several ways: by rejecting negligence as a sufficient
culpability standard for due process violations, 2 2 by denying claims
against the government for failing to protect an individual against
private violence, 223 by restricting suits against municipalities, 224
and by raising the level of culpability to "deliberate indifference" 22
with a consideration of whether the government's act "shocks the
conscience." 226 Moreover, the Court has employed three basic prin-
ciples in evaluating § 1983 claims:227 (1) judicial self-restraint, 228 (2)
the determination that § 1983 not replace state tort law,229 and (3)
the need for deference to local policymaking bodies in making deci-
sions that affect public safety.2 0 Thus, the Court would support a
test that restricts liability under the state-created danger theory.
2. Government Freedom to Make Choices Requires Confining the
State-Created Danger Theory
Moreover, government actors require freedom in allocating
their resources, weighing safety considerations, and heeding the
voices of the public at large. 23' Consequently, the state-created dan-
ger theory should be narrowly construed in order to avoid usurping
state decisions and legislative choices. 232 In consideration of this
aim, the Supreme Court has counseled lower courts to use caution
in holding state actors liable under § 1983 and has reminded them
that governmental decisions involve a "host of policy choices" that
are best made by locally elected representatives and not by federal
have been deprived by the government, but the Court has not followed Congress' suggestions.
Id. at 518-19 n.7.
222. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 330 (1986) CNot only does the word 'deprive' in
the Due Process Clause connote more than a negligent act, but we should not 'open the federal
courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power.' ") (quoting Parratt V.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981)).
223. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 (1989) C'[A] State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.").
224. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (stating that municipalities can-
not be liable under § 1983 "unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort"); see also supra note 17.
225. E.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992).
226. Id. at 126.
227. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 573 (1995).
228. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 ('[The Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept
of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted
area are scarce and open-ended.").
229. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
230. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29.




judges. 233 Congress did not intend for the Due Process Clause to be
a guarantee against ill-advised personnel decisions.23 4 Bowing to
the words of the Court, a few federal courts have explicitly voiced
concern that the judiciary could use § 1983, and particularly the
state-created danger theory, to second-guess decisions better left to
government actors.23 5
Expanding the state-created danger theory may deter gov-
ernment officials from taking risks and executing their functions for
the public's greatest benefit.2 36 Section 1983 liability often leads to
enormous personal detriment for a government actor, including
reputation harm, litigation expenses, and monetary damages.23 7
While the prospect of liability encourages officials to act
cautiously,23 8 government officials are not rewarded for risk, as are
private actors, so they are more likely to avoid any action that could
possibly lead to personal or municipal liability.239 Often, the course
of action with the least amount of risk is a sub-optimal one; for ex-
ample, a police officer may refuse to pursue a suspect in order to
avoid injuring any potential bystanders and therefore incur § 1983
liability.20 An expansion of § 1983 via the state-created danger the-
ory forces a government actor to deliberate more about his own in-
terests rather than the interests of the public at large. 241
Perhaps most importantly, the principle of separation of
powers cautions against expanding the state-created danger theory
in a way that allows the judiciary to usurp legislative choices. A2 In
several dases, for example, courts have essentially overruled police
233. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976).
234. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29.
235. Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1064 (lst Cir. 1997) (noting that an expanded state-
created danger theory could turn every negligent, or even willfully reckless, state action into a
violation of the federal Constitution); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1178 (4th Cir. 1995)
("Broad affirmative duties thus provide a fertile bed for § 1983 litigation, and the resultant gov-
ernmental liability would wholly defeat the purposes of qualified immunity.").
236. Bruce A.- Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis" United
States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovreign Immunity, 72 NOTRE DAE L, REV.
447, 482-83 (1997).
237. See Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 276-77.
238. Harvard 1, Rev. Ass'n, supra note 26, at 2014.
239. Id. at 2015.
240. Id. at 2015-16. For example, if the Court had held the DSS liable in DeShaney, then so-
cial workers today might choose not to act all in a Joshua-type situation rather than act incom-
pletely and incur liability.
241. Id. at 2016.
242. Osborne M. Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 122 (1968) (stating that the legislative branch is better suited to evaluate
information and make policy decisions).
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department policy by imposing a requirement that officers provide
for the safety of an arrested person's companions. 248 These courts
often do not realize that government agencies institute policies and
plans after weighing the costs and benefits of alternative actions in
light of what they believe is the desire of the electorate. 244 Without
a doubt, making budgetary and resource allocation decisions has
always been relegated to political bodies.245 Such decisions require
significant information gathering, balancing of competing interests,
and listening to the voices of the people; thus, apolitical judicial en-
tities are often ill-equipped to second-guess many of these
decisions. 246 Courts that allow § 1983 recovery to plaintiffs based on
what is essentially a legislative choice become mini-legislatures
making decisions that are better left to the democratic process.
247
Consider, for example, those courts which have found state actors
liable by removing the specific-plaintiff requirement. These courts
hold that some state acts are so egregious that government actors
should be held accountable even when the government directs the
policy or act toward no specific victim but toward the public at
large. 248 Such a view, however, greatly expands § 1983 liability,
providing the judiciary with a tool that allows it to dismantle the
most serious of legislative decisions: those made on a class-wide
basis. 249 Many state activities and policies create at least some dan-
243. E.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff properly
stated § 1983 claim against officers who arrested her friend and left her to walk home alone);
Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff properly stated § 1983 claim
against officers who arrested a car's driver and left the drunk passengers alone).
244. Harvard L. Rev. Ass'n, supra note 26, at 2016; see also Brief for City of Garland, Texas,
et aL, Amici Curiae, at 7, Piotrowski v. City of Houston (1999) (pointing out that the government
regularly "places persons in some degree of danger or another simply by the way it allocates its
resources: a choice of police patrol routes, a decision concerning which crimes to investigate,"
etc.).
245. Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systematic Harms, and the Due Process
Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 1003 (1996).
246. Id. Several commentators, however, strongly urge courts to continue expanding § 1983
liability because they believe there are a number of problems and inadequacies in leaving all
decisions to the legislature. For example, administrative agencies often develop regulatory goals
different from those set forth by the legislature. And agencies are often influenced by the lobby.
ing of narrow groups of interested parties who do not represent the entire electorate. E.g., Jack
M. Beerman, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1078, 1103-04.
247. Berkovitz v. United States 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988); Mann v. State, 70 Cal. App. 3d
773, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that government immunity "was designed to prevent politi-
cal decisions of policy-making officials of government from being second-guessed by judges and
juries").
248. E.g., Reed, 986 F.2d at 1122.
249. Most government policies are made after weighing the costs and benefits to different
groups in society. Deciding to patrol certain streets instead of other ones, for example, means
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ger to the public, as is true of most any endeavor, but not all should
result in constitutional tort liability.250
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney left open a tenu-
ous but significant method of finding that the State deprived citi-
zens of their constitutional rights, despite a private party's inter-
vention. Ten years later, the theory continues to baffle and divide
lower courts as they adjudicate state-created danger cases. The Pio-
trowski decision's $18.1 million verdict against a police department,
who even arrested and imprisoned Piotrowski's gunman, illustrates
both the theory's importance and its odd results.
Section 1983 plaintiffs, lower court judges, and litigation-
weary officials and municipalities are demanding some agreement
and clarification among the state-created danger tests.2 1 Consid-
ering the Supreme Court's extreme reluctance regarding § 1983 li-
ability and the need for legislative freedom regarding resource allo-
cation and decision-making, the recommended test set forth above
is the most logical solution.
Jeremy Daniel Kernodle"
providing protection to some citizens and not to others. Courts must require plaintiffs to show
that the government directed its act toward them specifically as opposed to a large group of peo-
ple; otherwise, a complaining plaintiff could effectively veto any government policy that could
lead to harming a group of people. See Brief for City of Garland, Texas, et al., Amici Curiae, at
23, Piotrowski v. City of Houston (1999) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit should adopt a specific
plaintiff requirement to "remove from liability governmental decisions made on a class-wide
basis").
250. UhIrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995) ("For the State to be liable under §
1983 for creating a special danger, a plaintiff must allege a constitutionally cognizable danger.").
251. Supra note 211.
I would like to thank Professor Laura Fitzgerald for her comments while writing this
Note. For suggesting the topic and providing relevant briefs, I thank the attorneys at Haynes
and Boone. And, finally, I thank my wife, Robin, for her patience and encouragement.
20011

